


# Model Driven Security: from UML Models to Access Control Infrastructures

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Jürgen Doser  
Torrsten Lodderstedt


## outline:

- problem domain / problem solving
- approach
- example
- bottom line


# common software engineering process



# security requirements



# security requirements



# development of security requirements

- very late ad hoc integration of implemented security mechanisms
  - hard to keep track of security requirements through development
- ➡ different representations of system / security

# problem solving

- one representation for system and security
- manual implementation is ambiguous:  
remove ambiguity


## outline:

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# MDA: Model Driven Architecture

- specify system in abstract model
- apply transformation functions
- result:  
system specified in target platform  
e.g. EJB, .NET ...  
( only architecture, no business logic )



The screenshot displays a software development environment with three main panels:

- Left Panel (Diagram Centre):** A tree view showing the project structure for 'StattAuto'. Under 'Class Diagrams', the 'Reservation' class is selected.
- Top Right Panel (UML Class Diagram):** A UML class diagram showing three classes:
  - Member** (EntityObject): Attributes include Number (Key), FirstName, and LastName.
  - Reservation** (EntityObject): Attributes include ReservationBeginDate, ReservationEndDate, and Number (Key). Methods include Criteria, Member, getNumber, and setNumber.
  - Vehicle** (EntityObject): Attributes include LicenceNumber, Description, Number (Key), and VehicleClass.
 Relationships: Member has a many-to-one relationship with Reservation (indicated by an arrow with '\*' on the Member side and '1' on the Reservation side). Reservation has a one-to-many relationship with Vehicle (indicated by an arrow with '1' on the Reservation side and '\*' on the Vehicle side).
- Bottom Panel (Code Editor):** Shows the Java source code for the Reservation class. The 'Criteria' method is highlighted, showing its signature and implementation.
 

```

// @param VehicleNumber
// @poseidon-object-id [Ilsmma1665]
public void Criteria(String VehicleNumber) {           /** lock-end */
    // your code here
} /** lock-begin */


<< @param memberNumber
) /** lock-end */

```

simplified example:  
poseidon UML Class Diagram to Java Class


# MDS: Model Driven Security

- specify system and security together in an abstract model
- apply transformation functions
- result:  
**security aware system**  
specified in target platform  
e.g. EJB, .NET ...  
( only architecture, no business logic )



... but how to build a model?

- modeling language



... but how to build a modeling language for MDS?



# modeling language combination schema

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# modeling language combination schema




system design modeling  
language

# modeling language combination schema





system design modeling  
language



security modeling  
language



# modeling language combination schema




system design modeling language

dialect

security modeling language

# modeling language combination schema




system design modeling language

dialect

security modeling language

security design language

# modeling language combination schema



system and security  
modeled with security design language

## outline:

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# example




## Briefing with “M”




- I need mi6 to get a new system
- I like my cars: protect them with RBAC
- I want everything deployed as EJBs

# Role Based Access Control



# Role Based Access Control





# EJB: Enterprise Java Beans

- **Enterprise JavaBeans™ (EJB)** is a managed, server-side component architecture for modular construction of enterprise applications.


# EJB: Security - role based access control

```
<method-permission>
  <role-name>employee</role-name>
  <method>
    <ejb-name>AardvarkPayroll</ejb-name>
    <method-name>findByPrimaryKey</method-name>
  </method>


  <method>
    <ejb-name>AardvarkPayroll</ejb-name>
    <method-name>getEmployeeInfo</method-name>
  </method>

  <method>
    <ejb-name>AardvarkPayroll</ejb-name>
    <method-name>updateEmployeeInfo</method-name>
  </method>
</method-permission>
```

# mi6 - car access policy



# modeling language combination schema



system design modeling  
language

dialect

security modeling  
language

security design language

# modeling language combination schema

mi6UML

SecureUML

system design modeling  
language

dialect


security modeling  
language




security design language

Securemi6UML

# system: protected resources






# role and entity







# permissions as association class




# role: serviceAgent - permission I




# role: serviceAgent - permission II



# role: simpleAgent - permission I




# model








# CompositeAction

## CompositeAction: read\_specs



```
<<ClassMethodAction>> Car_getManufacturerName: execute  
<<ClassMethodAction>> Car_getModelName: execute  
<<ClassMethodAction>> Car_getMPG: execute
```

# model



<<Permission>>

<<Permission>>

<<Permission>>

# CompositeAction

## CompositeAction: read\_all

<<ClassMethodAction>> Car\_getManufacturerName: execute  
<<ClassMethodAction>> Car\_getModelName: execute  
<<ClassMethodAction>> Car\_getMPG: execute  
<<ClassMethodAction>> Car\_getOilLevel: execute  
<<ClassMethodAction>> Car\_getWheels: execute



# CompositeAction

## CompositeAction: read\_all

<<ClassAction>> Car: read\_specs  
<<ClassMethodAction>> Car\_getOilLevel: execute  
<<ClassMethodAction>> Car\_getWheels: execute

# action hierarchy

CompositeAction:  
read\_specs


<<ClassMethodAction>> Car\_getManufacturerName: execute  
<<ClassMethodAction>> Car\_getModelName: execute  
<<ClassMethodAction>> Car\_getMPG: execute




CompositeAction:  
read\_all

<<ClassMethodAction>> Car\_getOilLevel: execute  
<<ClassMethodAction>> Car\_getWheels: execute

# model



# mi6 - car access policy



extend Car entity

**<<Entity>>**

**Car**

manufacturer\_name : String

model\_name : String

mpg : int

oil\_level : int

wheels : wheel[ ]


change\_wheel ( int )::void

refill\_oil( int )::void

open( )::void

**go\_for\_a\_ride()::void**

# model



# MDS: access control decisions

- declarative access control (static)  
⇒ Permissions
- programmatic access control (dynamic)  
⇒ AuthorizationConstraints

# programmatic access control

<b>permission-name</b>
permissions

<b>authorization constraint &lt;OCL expression&gt;</b>
--



## extend Car Entity

**<<Entity>>**

**Car**

manufacturer\_name : String

model\_name : String

mpg : int

oil\_level : int

wheels : wheel[ ]

**class : [ common | special ]**


change\_wheel ( int )::void

refill\_oil( int )::void


open( )::void

go\_for\_a\_ride()::void


# simpleAgent: may only drive common cars




# model




# mi6 - car access policy




# specialAgent:




# specialAgent: "may" only drive super cars



# specialAgents: don't do carsharing



# model






## change request




- I must reduce the CO2 emissions of our car fleet
- no car below 20 mpg may be used from now on


# model




# specialAgents may drive any car



# copy / paste simpleAgent permissions




# use role hierarchy



# MDS: Model Driven Security

- mi6 as model
- cars as protected resources
- RBAC based security policies
- empty EJB stubs + code implementing security mechanisms



## summary:





- roles | permissions | entities
- composite actions
- action hierarchy
- authorization constraints
- role hierarchy

# conventional approach vs. MDS

conventional approach	MDS
low level	arbitrary level of abstraction
policy format: XML	model elements (UML)
copy - paste / wildcards	hierarchy / composite container
running code from day 1	time intensive modeling, business logic comes later



remember:



## bottom line:

- model driven security offers:
  - common representation for system and security
  - general language composition schema
  - arbitrary levels of abstraction
  - unambiguous target code generation
  - semantics as basis for model checking


## bottom line:

- **model driven security drawbacks:**
  - **modeling needs time and skills**  
( reduce needed skills: tool development process, system development process)
  - **new composite actions / action hierarchies**  
⇒ **change the dialect**  
  
⇒ **recomposition of language**  
( can be solved with macros)
  - **modifying the model ⇒ apply transformation**  
  
**functions again**  
( can be solved with dedicated IDE or business logic stored outside of bean )
  - **( “code generator” needed )**




# SecureUML

- modeling language



# role based access control




PA

AA

70

# role based access control

$$\text{RBAC}_{\text{simple}} = \{$$
$$(\text{u}, \text{a}_1) \in \text{Users} \times \text{Actions} |$$
$$\exists \text{role}_1 \in \text{Roles}, \text{perm} \in \text{Permissions} .$$
$$(\text{u}, \text{role}_1) \in \text{UA} \wedge$$
$$(\text{role}_1, \text{perm}) \in \text{PA} \wedge$$
$$(\text{perm}, \text{a}_1) \in \text{AA}$$
$$\}$$


PA

AA

UA

70

# adding subjects






# adding subjects

$$\text{RBAC}_{w.subjects} = \{$$

$(u, a_1) \in Users \times Actions |$   
 $\exists sub \in Subjects, role_1 \in Roles, perm \in Permissions, a_1 \in Actions .$   
 $(sub, role_1) \in UA$   $\wedge$   
 $sub \geq_{Subjects} u$   $\wedge$   
 $(role_1, perm) \in PA$   $\wedge$   
 $(perm, a_1) \in AA$   
 $\}$



PA

AA

# adding role hierarchy

$$\text{RBAC}_{w.\text{roleH.}} = \{$$

$$(u, a_1) \in \text{Users} \times \text{Actions} |$$

$$\exists \text{sub} \in \text{Subjects}, \text{role}_1, \text{role}_2 \in \text{Roles}, \text{perm} \in \text{Permissions}, a_1 \in \text{Actions} .$$


$$(\text{sub}, \text{role}_1) \in \text{UA} \wedge$$

$$\text{sub} \geq_{\text{Subjects}} u \wedge$$

$$\text{role}_1 \geq_{\text{Roles}} \text{role}_2 \wedge$$

$$\text{role}_2, \text{perm} \in \text{PA} \wedge$$


$$(\text{perm}, a_1) \in \text{AA}$$

$$\}$$


# adding composite actions


$$\text{RBAC}_{w.compA.} = \{$$

$(u, a_1) \in Users \times Actions$   
 $\exists sub \in Subjects, role_1, role_2 \in Roles, perm \in Permissions, \underline{a_2 \in Actions}.$   
 $(sub, role_1) \in UA \wedge$   
 $sub \succeq_{Subjects} u \wedge$   
 $role_1 \succeq_{Roles} role_2 \wedge$   
 $\underline{a_2 \succeq_{Actions} a_1} \wedge$   
 $(role_2, perm) \in PA \wedge$   
 $\underline{(perm, a_2) \in AA}$   
 $\}$




# SecureUML


- modeling language



# abstract syntax



# abstract syntax SecureUML



source: Security Engineering, Prof. D. Basin <sub>77</sub>